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Abstract—In this paper, we propose the first homomorphic
based proxy re-encryption (HPRE) solution that allows different
users to share data they outsourced homomorphically encrypted
using their respective public keys with the possibility to process
such data remotely. More clearly, this scheme makes possible to
switch the public encryption key to another one without the help
of a trusted third party. Its originality stands on a method we
propose so as to compute the difference between two encrypted
data without decrypting them and with no extra communications.
Basically, in our HPRE scheme, the two users, the delegator and
the delegate, ask the cloud server to generate an encrypted noise
based on a secret key, both users previously agreed on. Based on
our solution for comparing encrypted data, the cloud computes
in clear the differences in-between the encrypted noise and the
encrypted data of the delegator, obtaining thus blinded data. By
next the cloud encrypts these differences with the public key of
the delegate. As the noise is also known of the delegate, this one
just has to remove it to get access to the data encrypted with his
public key. This solution has been experimented in the case of
the sharing of images outsourced into a semihonest cloud server.
Index Terms—Security confidentiality, processing of encrypted
data, homomorphic proxy re-encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Cloud computing allows data owners to use
massive data storage and large computation capabilities at
a very low costs. Despite these benefits, such a data out-
sourcing induces important security challenges. Indeed, data
owners lose the control over the pieces of information they
outsource. To protect data in terms of confidentiality and
privacy from unauthorized users as well as from the cloud,
one common solution consists in encrypting data. However,
if using encryption achieves data confidentiality, it may limit
the possible reuse or processing of outsourced data as well
as the sharing of data. In this work, we are interested in the
sharing of data between different users who have outsourced
their data encrypted with their own public keys, i.e. using some
asymmetric cryptosystem. Such a kind of problem is referred
as proxy re-encryption (PRE) [1], where Alice (the delegator
or the emitter) wants to share with Bob (the delegate or recip-
ient) some data she previously outsourced encrypted into the
cloud (the proxy). When working with asymmetric encryption,
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the objective of PRE is to securely enable the proxy to re-
encrypt Alice’s cipher-text, encrypted with her public key,
into a cipher-text that can be decrypted with Bob’s private
key. To do so, one simple PRE solution consists in asking
Alice to provide her private key to the proxy. However, this
strategy imposes the proxy to be completely trusted and does
not work in the case the cloud is considered as semi-honest
(i.e., it will not disclose the data but will be curious). Blaze et
al. [1] proposed the first PRE scheme in such a semi-honest
framework. This one is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem
and on a set of secret pieces of information, referred as secret
re-encryption key, Alice has to send to the proxy so as to
make possible the change of the public key encryption (i.e.,
re-encrypt data with Bob’s public key). One main issue of
this proposal, remarked by Ateniese et al. [2], is that Blaze
et al.’s scheme is inherently bidirectional, that is to say that
the re-encryption key which allows transferring cipher-texts
from Alice to Bob, enables the proxy to convert all Bob’s
cipher-texts under Alice’s public key. This is not acceptable
for Bob. The main reason of this is that the re-encryption
key depends on the delegate (Bob) private key. In order to
solve this problem and achieve a unidirectional PRE different
approaches have been proposed. The first class of methods
relies on classical asymmetric encryption cryptosystems. For
instance, [3] take advantage of a quorum-based protocol which
stands on distributed proxies, each of them possesses a part
of the data of Alice but receive a different re-encryption key
independent of Bob private key. However, with this approach,
the security of Alice private key is safe as long as some proxies
are honest. An alternative, proposed in [4], works with only
one proxy where the re-encryption key provided by Alice
is split into two parts, one for the proxy and the other for
Bob. Unfortunately, with [4], the data of Alice, she encrypted
with her public-key are turned into symmetrically encrypted
data and not asymmetrically with the public key of Bob. The
second class regroups methods referred as identity-based proxy
re-encryption (IBPRE) and was introduced by Green and
Ateniese [5]. Such a method mixes PRE with identity-based
cryptography (IBC). In IBC, the public encryption key of one
user is derived from his identity (e.g., his email address); by
combining it with PRE, the emitter and the proxy just need
to know the delegates’ identities instead of verifying their
certificates. Basically, the unidirectional propriety is achieves
due to the fact the re-encryption key depends on the identity of
the delegate. However, it must be known that IB-PRE suffers
of the key-escrow issue (see [4] for more details). Most of
these schemes also rely on cryptosystems which are based on
bilinear pairing [6]–[10], an application considered as a very
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2expensive in terms of computation complexity compared to
modular multiplication or exponentiation [11]. To overcome
this issue, Deng et al. [12] proposed an asymmetric cross-
cryptosystem re-encryption scheme instead of pairing. Beyond,
if the above approaches allow one user to share data with
another one, they do not make possible the processing of
encrypted data by the cloud or proxy. This capacity is usually
achieved with the help of homomorphic cryptosystems. With
these ones, one can perform operations onto encrypted data
with the guarantee that the decrypted result equals the one
carried out onto un-encrypted data [13]. The first homomor-
phic based PRE attempt has been proposed by Bresson et al.
in [14], using the Paillier cryptosystem [15]. However, even
though their solution makes possible data sharing, it cannot
be seen as a pure proxy re-encryption scheme. Indeed, data
are not re-encrypted with the public key of the delegate. If
this one wants to ask the cloud to process the data he receives
from Alice, he has: i) first to download Alice data, ii) decrypt
them based on some secret pieces of information provided by
Alice; iii) re-encrypt them with his public key and send them
back to the cloud. There is thus still a need for a homomorphic
based PRE.
In this work, we propose the first homomorphic proxy re-
encryption scheme which does not require the delegate to re-
upload the data another user has shared with him. It is based
on the Paillier cryptosystem. It can be roughly summarized
as follows. Bob and Alice agree on a secret key; key Alice
sends Paillier encrypted to the cloud. The cloud uses this key
so as to generate a Paillier encrypted random sequence with
the help of a secure linear congruential generator (SLCG) we
propose and which works in the Paillier encrypted domain. All
computations are conducted by the cloud server. This SLCG
provides a sequence of Paillier encrypted random numbers.
Based on a fast and new solution we propose so as to compute
the difference in-between Paillier encrypted data, the cloud:
i) computes in clear the difference between this encrypted
random sequence and the encrypted data of Alice and, ii)
encrypts this sequence of differences with the public key of
Bob. Then, Bob just has to ask the cloud to remove the noise
from the encrypted data in order to get access to the data Alice
wants to share with him and process them in an outsourced
manner if he wants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section II, we
come back on the definition of Paillier cryptosystem and show
how to use it in order to: i) quickly compute the difference
between Paillier encrypted data; and ii) implement a secure
linear congruential generator so as to generate an encrypted
random sequence. Section III describes the overall architecture
of our Homomorphic PRE solution (HPRE) in the case of the
sharing of images. Performance of the proposed solution is
given in Section IV. Conclusions are given in Section V.
II. PROCESSING PAILLIER ENCRYPTED DATA
In this section, we first introduce the Paillier cryptosystem as
well as a new way to compute the difference between Paillier
encrypted data before presenting a secure linear congruential
generator (LCG) implemented in the Paillier encrypted domain
so as to generate an encrypted pseudo random sequence of
integers.
A. Paillier cryptosystem
We opted for the asymmetric Paillier cryptosystem because
of its additive homomorphic property [15]. In this work, we
use a fast version of it defined as follows. Let ((g,Kp),Ks)
be the public/private key pair, such as:
Kp = pq and Ks = (p− 1)(q − 1) (1)
where p and q are two large prime integers. ZKp =
{0, 1, ...,Kp − 1} and Z∗Kp denotes the integers that have
multiplicative inverses modulo Kp. We select g ∈ Z∗K2p such
as:
gKs − 1modK2p
Kp
∈ Z∗Kp (2)
The Paillier encryption of a plain-text m ∈ ZKp into the
cipher-text c ∈ Z∗K2p using the public key Kp is given by
c = E[m, r] = gmrKp mod K2p (3)
where r ∈ Z∗Kp is a random integer associated to m making
the Paillier cryptosystem probabilistic or semantically secure.
More clearly, depending on the value of r, the encryption of
the same plain-text message will yield to different cipher-
texts even though the public encryption key is the same.
Notice that it is possible to get a fast version of (3) by fixing
g = 1+Kp without reducing the algorithm security. By doing
so, the encryption of m into c requires only one modular
exponentiation and two modular multiplications
c = E[m, r] = (1 +mKp)r
Kp mod K2p (4)
As we will see in section II-B, this property will be of
importance for the computation of the difference between
Paillier encrypted data.
Based on the assumption g = 1 + Kp, the decryption of c
using the private Key Ks is such as
m =
(cKs − 1)K−1s mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp (5)
If we consider two plain-texts m1 and m2, the additive ho-
momorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem allows linear
operations on encrypted data like addition and multiplication,
ensuring that
E[m1, r1]E[m2, r2] = E[m1 +m2, r1r2] (6)
E[m1, r1]
m2 = E[m1m2, r
m2
1 ] (7)
B. Computing the difference in-between encrypted data
In this work, we propose a solution that allows the calcula-
tion by one server of the difference between two Paillier en-
crypted data. More clearly if a and b are two integers, we want
to compute their difference a−b from their encrypted versions.
Let us consider a user-server relationship where the server
has two cipher-texts EKp [a, r] and EKp [b, r] encrypted by the
user. It is important to notice that to make such computation
3possible; the two cipher-texts have to be encrypted with the
same random value r. Under this constraint, one can directly
derive the difference d between a and b from EKp [a, r] and
EKp [b, r] by taking advantage of the fast Paillier cryptosystem
assumption, i.e. g = 1 +Kp, as follows
d = D(a, b) = De(EKp [a, r], EKp [b, r])
=
EKp [a,r]EKp [b,r]
−1−1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
=
garg−br−1−1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
=
ga−b−1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
d = a− b mod Kp
(8)
where D and De denote the two functions that allows comput-
ing the difference d in the clear and Paillier encrypted domain,
respectively. Notice that knowing the difference d between a
and b gives no clues about the values of a and b, respectively.
C. Secure Linear Congruential Generator
As stated in the introduction, our HPRE scheme will require
the cloud to securely generate a pseudo random sequence that
is to say a Paillier encrypted random sequence of integers.
The generator we propose to secure is LCG [16] (Linear
Congruential Generator). This one is based on congruence and
a linear functions; functions that can be easily implemented
in the Paillier encrypted domain. In the clear domain, LCG
works as follows
Xn+1 = aXn + c mod m (9)
where: Xn is the nth random integer value of the LCG
sequence; a is a multiplier; c is an increment; m is the modulo;
and, X0 the initial term, also called the seed or the secret
LCG key, one needs to know so as to re-generate a random
sequence. The security of the LCG is based on the seed X0.
The knowledge of the parameters a, c and m does not endanger
its security [16]. This random generator can be implemented
into the Paillier encrypted domain, i.e. turned into a Secure
LCG (SLCG), so as to generate an encrypted random sequence
of integers (i.e. {E[Xn, rn]}n=0...N−1) in the following way
:
E[Xn+1, rn+1] = E[Xn, rn]
aE[c, rc] = E[aXn + c, r
a
nrc]
(10)
under the constraint however that m equals the user Paillier
public key Kp, (i.e., m = Kp, see (1)). If the increment as
well as all terms of the sequence are encrypted (including the
LCG seed) that is not the case of the multiplier a. However,
this does not reduce the security of our system as the parameter
a is not supposed to be secret [16]. It is important to notice
that, in our SLCG, a recursive relation exists between the
random integers rn which ensure the semantic security of the
Paillier cryptosystem. Derived from (10), this one is such as:
rn+1 = r
a
nrc (11)
Fig. 1: General framework for data sharing through public-
cloud
where rc is the random variable used to encrypt the increment.
r0 is the random value associated to the seed X0. This
recursive relationship will be considered in Section III-B so
as to allow data exchange between two different users.
III. SHARING OUTSOURCED ENCRYPTED DATA
In this Section, we first refine the data exchange framework
we consider and its basic security assumptions. We then
present our Homomorphic based Proxy Re-Encryption scheme
(HPRE).
A. Data exchange scenario in outsourced environment
Fig. 1 illustrates the general data exchange framework we
consider where a data owner (the emitter or the delegator)
has a priori stored his data into a public cloud in an asym-
metrically encrypted form; data he wants to share with another
user (the recipient or the delegate). We further assume a semi-
honest cloud server. This one honestly stores encrypted data
uploaded by the users and responds to their requests. If the
server does not disclose data to any parties who fail to prove
ownership or access rights, it is however curious and may try to
infer information about the content of users’ data or about their
private keys. One last assumption is that all communications
between the server and the users are protected with the
help of the Paillier cryptosystem. Eavesdroppers cannot infer
messages being transmitted. As stated previously, our objective
is to allow them to share some data under the constraint the
delegator does not have to download his data, re-encrypt them
with the public key of the delegate and upload them into
the cloud. We also want this process conducted by the cloud
(proxy) without giving the delegator private key as well as
with very few communications in-between the delegator, the
proxy and the delegate. In our idea, if one user wants to share
data with several users at once, all of them will have to agree
on a single secret with the delegator.
B. Secure data exchange between users
Let us thus consider that Alice (the delegator) wants to share
with Bob (the delegate) a set of data she is the owner of. These
data could be a set of integer values like for instance a gray-
scale image I , the N pixels of which I = {Ii}i=0..N−1 are
4Fig. 2: Main steps of our HPRE for an image sharing
encoded on b bits. As stated previously, it is assumed that Alice
has already outsourced an image into the cloud by Paillier
encrypting its pixels independently with her public key Kp1,
such as (see in Fig. 2 Data outsourcing step)
Iei = EKp1 [Ii, ri] (12)
where ri is the random value associated to the ith pixel Ii
of I , Iei is the encrypted version of Ii. As we will see in the
sequel, our HPRE procedure imposes a constraint on the way
Alice generates the random values {ri}i=0..N−1. These ones
should satisfy (11), that is to say that for one file Alice stores
into the cloud, she has to memorize the first random value
rc and r0 she used when she encrypted the first pixel of her
image (or of any files she stored), Ie0 = EKp1 [I0, r0].
In order to share this encrypted image with Bob, the public
Paillier encryption key of whom is Kp2, we propose the
following HPRE procedure also depicted in Fig. 2
1) User agreement for data exchange - In this first tsep,
Bob and Alice have to agree on the exchange by defining
the LCG parameters, in other words: the secret key X0,
the multiplier a and the increment c. Let us recall that
knowing c and a is not critical from a security point of
view (see Section II-C).
2) Secret random sequence generation - Alice encrypts
X0 and c under her public key Kp1: EKp1 [X0, r0]
EKp1 [c, rc], and sends them to the cloud. Notice that
X0 is encrypted with the same random integer r0 Alice
used to encrypt the first pixel of her image (see above).
She also sends the multiplier a. Based on these pieces
of information, the cloud generates the secret random
sequence Xe = {Xei = EKp1 [Xi, ri]}i=0..N−1 using
(10).
3) Data encryption for the delegator - This procedure
relies on different stages: i) the computation of differ-
ences between the encrypted data of Alice (Ie) and the
secret random sequence (Xe); ii) the encryption of this
differences with the public key of Bob Kp2.
a) Difference computation - since Xei and I
e
i have
been encrypted with the same public key Kp1 and
the same random values ri (see above), the cloud
computes their difference Di as exposed in see
Section II-B, that is to say
Di = D(Xi, Ii) = D
e(EKp1 [Xi, ri], EKp1 [Ii, ri])
= Xi − Ii mod Kp1
(13)
Even though the cloud knows D = {Di}i=0...N−1,
it cannot deduce the value of Ii and Xi.
b) Data encryption for the delegator - From this stand
point, one may think the cloud just has to encrypt
D with the public key of Bob, Kp2, and then
5Fig. 3: Samples of face database
remove the noise so as so to give him access
to the data. This is possible under the constraint
Di mod Kp1 = Di mod Kp2 which is achieved
when 0 < Di < min(Kp1,Kp2). Unfortunately,
this constraint is hard to satisfy because of the
SLCG the output amplitude of which can not be
controlled simply. To overcome this issue, our
HPRE includes a ”noise refreshment procedure”
(see Fig. 2) before encrypting the data with the
public key of Bob.
• Noise refreshment
To refresh the noise, Bob first generates on his
side the sequence {Xi}i=0..N−1, using an LCG
parameterized as the SLGC of the cloud. He also
produces a second noise {βi}i=0..N−1 such as:
2b − 1 < βi < min(Kp1,Kp2) (14)
where b is the number of bits on which is encoded
the pixel values of the image of Alice. Under
such a constraint: we ensure: βi mod Kp1 =
βi mod Kp2 and βi − Ii mod Kp1 = βi −
Ii mod Kp2. Then Bob sends to the cloud
{EKp2 [βi, r′i]}i=0...N−1 and {αi = βi − Xi
mod Kp1}i=0..N−1. Where r′i is a random value
defined by Bob.
On its side, in order to remove the noise
{Xi}i=0...N−1, the cloud computes
Gi = αi +Di mod Kp1 = βi − Ii mod Kp1
(15)
Then it encrypts {Gi}i=0..N−1 with the public key
of Bob
{EKp2 [Gi, r′′i ] = EKp2 [βi−Ii, r′′i ]}i=0..N−1 (16)
Finally, in order to remove the noise βi from of
the data of Bob, the server computes
EKp2 [Ii, r
′
ir
′′−1
i ] = EKp2 [βi, r
′
i]EKp2 [βi−Ii, r′′i ]−1
(17)
At the end of this procedure, Bob has on the cloud the
image of Alice encrypted with his own public key.
As depicted, this system allows the data exchange between
Alice and Bob, without extra-communication between the
cloud and Alice, and the downloading of data by Bob. It is also
possible to notice that the access to the shared data is based
on the knowledge of the secret SLCG key X0 generated by
Alice in agreement with Bob. Because our scheme is based
on homormophic encryption, data can be by next processed
by the cloud without endangering data confidentiality.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The previous solution was experimented in the case of the
sharing of uncompressed images between two users. These
images are issued from the Olivetti Research Laboratory of
Cambridge, UK. It contains 400 images of 8 bit encoded
of 92 × 122 pixels. Some samples of our image test set
are given Fig. 3. These images were encrypted with Paillier
public keys of more than 1024 bits in order to provide a high
level of security. Performance of our scheme are evaluated in
terms of storage and computation complexity. Our HPRE was
implemented in C/C++ with GMP library and all experiments
were conducted using a machine equipped with 23GB RAM
running on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
• Storage complexity:
Assuming that images are Paillier encrypted with a key of
1024 bits, one encrypted image needs 2, 7Mo so as to be
stored into the cloud. For one image the delegator (Alice)
outsources, she only has to store on her side the random
values r0 and rc. However this is not obligation. Indeed, based
on the fact she knows both her public and private keys, she
just has to download the encrypted seed EKp1 [X0, r0] and
the encrypted increment EKp1 [c, rc], to get access to these
random values (i.e. rc and r0). During an image exchange,
the delegator sends the encrypted seed EKp1 [X0, r0], the
encrypted increment EKp1 [c, rc] and the multiplier a. This
amount of data is bounded by O(log2(K2p1)). For a key of
1024 bits, it is closed to 2048 bits. On its side, the delegate
(Bob) has to store X0, the secret key of the LCG, but only
for one session of data exchange.
• Computation complexity:
On the delegator side, the computation complexity is limited
to the encryption of the SLCG parameters (i.e. X0, c). Such a
complexity is independent of the image’s size. Regarding the
cloud, this one has to compute: the secret random sequence,
compute the difference between the encrypted date of Alice
with this random sequence, refresh the noise based on the
inputs of Bob, encrypt the result with the public key of Bob
and finally remove the noise. For an image of N pixels, the
secret random sequence generation is equivalent to N encryp-
tions. It is the same for the computation of the differences
{Di}i=0...N−1. As described above, the noise refreshment
procedure consists in modular additions. We consider its
complexity negligible compared to encryption operations. The
last step, the encryption of the differences {Gi}i=0...N−1 is
made of N encryptions. As a consequence, the computation
complexity for the cloud is bounded by O(3×N) encryptions.
The delegate computation complexity is attached to the
noise refreshment procedure. He has to generate a LCG
noise (i.e. {Xi}i=0...N−1), a task the complexity of which is
negligible compared to the N encryptions of the second noise
(i.e. {βi}i=0...N−1) he also produces and that he next sends
to the cloud. The computation complexity of the delegate is
thus of N encryptions. We provide in Table I the amount of
data that each entities has to store as well as the computation
time required in the case of sharing images of our data set.
Our HPRE scheme takes about 1′30 minutes so as to share an
image with a standard computer.
6Entities Delegator (Alice) Proxy (Cloud) Delegate (Bob)
Time computation (sec) 0.002 90 30
Encrypted data volume of 0 22986753 2048
TABLE I: Amount of information stored (in bits) as well as the corresponding computation time that each entity needs (Alice,
Bob and the cloud) for sharing an image of 92× 122 pixels
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the first homomorphic proxy
re-encryption scheme. Its originality stands on a solution we
propose so as to compute the difference of data encrypted
with the fast version of the Paillier cryptosystem. It takes
also advantage of a secure linear congruential generator
we implemented in the Paillier encrypted domain. This one
drastically reduces the computation complexity of the cloud
and delegator. Furthermore, this solution doesn’t need extra
communication between the cloud and the delegator, i.e. the
data owner. Moreover, since the data are homomorphically
encrypted, it is possible to process outsourced data while
ensuring their confidentiality. Our HPRE was implemented
in the case of the sharing of uncompressed images stored in
the cloud showing good time computation performance. Our
scheme is not limited to images and can be used with any
kinds of data.
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